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YOUNG V. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.:
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS TO THE RESCUE?
WILLIAM R. CORBETT

*

ABSTRACT

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 can be interpreted in two
obvious ways: one interpretation requires employers to make reasonable
accommodations for pregnant employees, and the other does not require
such accommodations. Jn Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the
Supreme Court held that in some cases employees may be able to prove
intentional pregnancy discrimination based on an employer's failure to
make accommodations for the pregnant employee when the employer
makes accommodations for other disabled employees. Rather than
reaching this result by interpreting the statute to require reasonable
accommodations, however, the Court held that plaintiffs with "indirect
evidence" of discrimination may prove their claim using the pretext
analysis developed by the Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.
Under this analysis, the Court instructed that, after the first two stages of
the analysis, a plaintiff could attempt to prove that the employer's
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying an accommodation for a
pregnant employee is pretextual, and this could be proven by
demonstrating the significant and unjustified burden the employer's
nonaccommodation policy imposes on pregnant employees. Although it
seems that the Court resorted to McDonnell Douglas as a compromise to
fashion a majority opinion, this essay contends that invocation of the
McDonnell Douglas analysis was neither necessary nor prudent. There
are two likely ramifications of the Court's use of the McDonnell Douglas
analysis. The first is that the Young opinion is likely to resurrect the
division of intentional discrimination claims between those based on direct
evidence and those based on circumstantial evidence, with the claims in
those two categories being analyzed differently. That is a distinction that
the Court rejected in 2003 in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa. Second, the
Court's resort to the McDonnell Douglas analysis refortifies a proof
framework which arguably should not have survived the Desert Palace
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decision and which has constrained the robust development of employment
discrimination law by forcing evidence in most cases into proxy questions
or categories that have only a tangential relationship to the ultimate issue
of discrimination. Too many claims in employment discrimination law are
forced into the McDonnell Douglas analysis, which often serves to
obscure the actual issues presented. Neither of the foregoing potential
ramifications is a good development for employment discrimination law.
Young v. UPS could-and should-have been resolved without resort to
McDonnell Douglas.
I. INTRODUCTION

1
In Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the Supreme Court confronted
the

meaning

of

pregnancy

discrimination under the Pregnancy
2
Specifically, the Court was called

Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA).

upon to decide whether an employer intentionally discriminated against a
pregnant employee when that employer made accommodations in the form
of temporary job reassignments for other employees who were temporarily
unable to perform their jobs due to on-the-job injuries, disabilities covered
by the Americans with Disabilities Act, or loss of certification, but did not
offer any such reassignment to a pregnant employee who was disqualified
from performing her job as a driver due to lifting restrictions. The case
seemingly required the Court to interpret the meaning and relationship of
3
the two clauses of the PDA. The Court appeared to be put to the choice of
two viable statutory interpretations--0ne that would require employers in
some circumstances to provide reasonable accommodations to pregnant

I.

135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).

2.

Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2679 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)

(2012)).
3. The two clauses are separated by a semicolon. The first clause seemingly treats pregnancy
discrimination as nothing more than a subset of sex discrimination, which would not encompass a duty
on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommodations for pregnant employees. The second
clause, on the other hand, seemingly requires something more than nondiscrimination on the basis of
sex. The second clause can be interpreted as imposing a duty of reasonable accommodation because it
states that pregnant employees are to be accorded the same treatment as a group of nonpregnant
employees who have abilities and disabilities similar to those of pregnant employees. The PDA
provides as follows:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to, because of
or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
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nonpregnant

comparators, and one that would treat pregnancy as merely a subset of sex
discrimination

and

would

not

require

reasonable

accommodation

regardless of the employer's accommodation of other similarly disabled
nonpregnant employees. Remarkably, the Court did not approve either of
these viable statutory interpretations. Yet it still found a way to vacate the
summary judgment that had been granted in favor of the employer and
remand the case. Eschewing the most likely statutory interpretations, 4 the
Court

was rescued

by invoking the much-maligned5

framework developed in 1973 in McDonnell Douglas Corp.

pretext
v.

proof
6
Green.

The 6-3 decision by the Court in Young crafts a middle-ground,
compromise analysis to keep alive a pregnant plaintiff's opportunity to
prove intentional discrimination. It appears that in order to gamer the
votes for a majority opinion, the Court found it necessary to summon the
McDonnell

Douglas

analysis,

which

requires

compartmentalizing

evidence of discrimination in a three-stage burden-shifting proof structure
for which each part and the whole is only loosely related to the ultimate
issue of discrimination. The majority's opinion likely will result in
pregnancy accommodation claims surviving summary judgment and
7
getting to the fact finder in numerous cases, and consequently may
prompt employers to grant accommodations for pregnancy to avoid
protracted litigation. 8

4. The Court stated that it was opting for a third interpretation by imposing

McDonnell

Douglas. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 135 3 ("The statute lends itself to an interpretation other than those that
the parties advocate and that the dissent sets forth.").
5.

The criticism of McDonnell Douglas has been ongoing and escalating for many years. See,

e.g., De borah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229
(1995); Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of Second-Order Uniformity in Disparate Treatment Law:

McDonnell Douglas's Longevity and the Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 5 11 (2008); Stephen

W. Smith, Title VJ/'s National Anthem: ls There a Prima Facie Case for the Prima Facie Case?, 12

LAB. LAW. 371 (1997).
6.

411 U.S. 7 9 2 ( 1973) ; see also infra text accompanying notes 19-26.

7.

A court already has relied on Young in this way. About a week after Young was decided, a

fe deral district court denied the City of New York's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in a case based on
failure to accommodate a pregnant employee, stating that the Supreme Court "recently dispelled any
doubt that a plaintiff may bring a PDA claim based on her employer's failure to accommodate her
pregnancy." LaSalle v. City of New York, No. 13 Civ. 5 109 (PAC),
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2015).

2015 WL 1442376, at *3

8. See Ann C. McGinley, Young v. U P S, Inc.: A Victory.for Pregnant Employees?, HAMILTON
AND GRIFFIN ON RIGHTS (Mar. 29, 2015), http://hamilton-griffin.com/guest-b1og-ann-mcginley-young
v-ups-inc-a-victory-for-pregnant-employees/.
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There is much fodder for discussion in the various opinions in

Young.9

The most discussed issue in the case may prove to be the Court's apparent
merger of disparate treatment and disparate impact under the third prong
of the

McDonnell Douglas analysis, 10 although the Court appears to have

adequately

cabined

its analysis

to the

small

number

of pregnancy

discrimination claims that are wedged between the two clauses of the
11
PDA. Indeed, the interaction of disparate treatment and disparate impact
is an issue that has occupied the Court's attention in some recent cases,
including most conspicuously in 2009 in

2

Ricci v. DeStefano. 1

I wish to address neither the likely effect of the decision on pregnancy
accommodation nor the majority's putative blending of disparate treatment
and disparate impact. Rather, I will examine what may be the larger
ramifications for employment discrimination law of the majority's flying
in

McDonnell Douglas to provide the rescue as a compromise rationale for
Young decision. It is unfortunate that the Court resorted to the
McDonnell Douglas analysis to achieve this result. The Court suggested
the

that the analysis it crafted likely was limited to the PDA context,

13

and
14
even in that context, may be needed for only a short period of time.

Although the Court's variation on the

McDonnell Douglas analysis for

accommodation claims under the PDA may be supplanted by an analysis
under the ADA Amendments Act, as the
Court's resort to the

Young majority suggested, the
McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis is not likely to

be insignificant or short-lived.
Contrary to the Court's assurances regarding the limited significance of
the decision, invoking

McDonnell Douglas to resolve whether the PDA

imposes a duty of reasonable accommodation will likely have two
negative ramifications for the larger body of employment discrimination
law. First, the Court's use of the pretext analysis will probably rejuvenate
the vexatious distinction between employment discrimination claims based
on

direct

9.

evidence

and

those

based

on

circumstantial

or

indirect

The majority opinion was authored by Justice Breyer. Justice Alito wrote a concurring

opinion, and Justice Scalia wrote the principal dissent, with Justice Kennedy also filing a dissenting
opinion.

10.
11.

See infra text accompanying note 63.
Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1355 ("This approach, though limited to the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act context .... )
12. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
13. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1355.
14. The Court suggested that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, as interpreted by the Equal
"

.

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), may cover such cases arising after the
effective date
of that Act. Id. at 1348.

20 1 5]
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evidence. Is That distinction is one the Court said it was laying to rest in
I6
2003 in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa. Second, the Court has refortified
the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis, which arguably should not have
survived Desert Palace.11 This proof framework, which requires that all
evidence of discrimination be crammed into three categories, regardless of
the suitability or fit, was featured by the Court in Young as a way to
resolve a hard question in employment discrimination law. Neither of
these likely ramifications will be a positive development in employment
discrimination law, returning the law to nettlesome issues that should have
been resolved in Desert Palace. The Court should be retiring McDonnell
Douglas rather than invoking it as the panacea for hard issues. If I am
correct about the legacy of Young, we will rue the day that the Court
unnecessarily summoned McDonnell Douglas to the rescue.
II.

PRELUDE TO YOUNG

V.

UPS: FROM MCDONNELL DOUGLAS TO
DESERT PALACE

Much of the development of federal employment discrimination law in
the courts and many of the Supreme Court's employment discrimination
opinions have focused on the proof structures used to analyze individual
disparate treatment claims. Is The Supreme Court created two proof
frameworks to analyze such claims. The Court first announced the pretext
framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green19 in 1 973. The
McDonnell Douglas pretext framework is a three-part proof structure with
shifting burdens of production. A plaintiff bears the initial burden of
production to establish a prima facie case by proving ( 1 ) that he belongs to
a protected class, (2) that he applied for and was qualified for the job,
(3) that despite his qualifications, he was rejected, and (4) that the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants having the

15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra Part IV.A.
539 U.S. 90, IOI (2003).
See infra Part IV.B.

The Court provided a primer on theories of discrimination in Young, explaining that disparate
treatment is "a claim that an employer intentionally treat[s] a complainant less favorably than
employees with the 'complainant's qualifications' but outside the complainant's protected class."

Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1345. The Court also explained two other theories of discrimination-disparate
impact, based on discriminatory effects of a facially neutral employment practice in which intent or
motive is not required, and "pattern-or-practice" (also known as systemic disparate treatment),
based
on proof of intentional discrimination as the employer's standard operating procedure. Id;
see
lnt'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
between disparate treatment and disparate impact).

19. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

also

324, 335 n.15 (1977) (explaining the differences

[ VOL. 92:1683
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plaintiffs qualifications.20 The Court noted in McDo�nell ouglas that the
of the prima facie case will vary with different factual

elements

situations.21 If the plaintiff satisfies the burden of the prima facie case, the
burden of production shifts to the defendant-employer to present a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.22 Finally, if the
employer satisfies its burden at the second stage, the burden of production

shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's proffered reason is
a pretext for discrimination.23
The McDonnell Douglas opinion announced the proof structure, but the
mechanics and meaning of the analysis were not fully developed at that
time. The Court found it necessary to explain the meaning and procedural
effect of the second and third stages of the analysis in several subsequent
cases. These decisions include Texas Department of Community Affairs v.

Burdine,24 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,25 and Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc. 26 The decisions helped to clarify the standards
and burdens of proof under the pretext framework, but

even

these

decisions did not make the pretext framework easily applicable in all
employment discrimination cases. The Court eventually would develop a
second framework for individual disparate treatment claims.
The court announced this alternative proof structure, mixed motives, in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.27 Whereas the pretext analysis by design

20.

at 802.

21.

at 802 n. 13.

Id.
Id.
22. Id.
23. id.

at 802-03.
al 804.

24.

450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981) (explaining the defendant's burden at stage two).

25.

509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (explaining the effect of proof of pretext in a fully tried case).

530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000) (explaining the effect of proof of pretext at summary judgment).
The Supreme Court has never held that the pretext analysis is applicable to analyze ADEA cases,

26.

although ii assumed so in Consolidated Coin Caterers, and lower courts have routinely applied it. See
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996) ("In assessing claims of age
discrimination brought under the ADEA, the Fourth Circuit, like others, has applied some variant of
the basic evidcntiary framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. We have never had occasion to
decide whether that application of the Title VII rule to the ADEA context is correct, but since the
parties do not contest that point, we shall assume it."). In addition, the Court seems to have approved

the applicability of the pretext analysis lo disability discrimination claims under the ADA. See
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n.3 (2003). The McDonnell Douglas framework is also
commonly adopted by courts to analyze claims under state employment discrimination laws. See,
e.g.,
Zani boni v. Mass. Trial Court, 96! N.E.2d 155, 158 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (stating that the analysis
.
applies to claims under Massachusetts employment discrimination law). Beyond employment
discrimination law, the pretext analysis has been adopted to analyze other types
of federal and state
employment claims. See, e.g., Sabounn v. Univ. of Utah, 676 F.3d 950, 958 (10th
Cir. 2012) (applying
analysis to a rctaliati�n claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act); Eagen
v. Comm'n on Human

i:

Rights & Oppo umttes, 42 A.3d 478, 487 & n.5 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012)
(recognizing adoption of
.
pretext analysis tor vanous types of state employment law claims).
27 .

490 U.S. 228 ( 1989).
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identifies "the real reason" for the employment decision and rejects other
reasons as pretext, the mixed-motives proof structure acknowledges that
an employer

may have

considered multiple factors

in

making the

employment decision and that the discriminatory reason is only one of
those factors. In Price Waterhouse, the plurality opinion and Justice
O'Connor's concurrence applied different standards to the plaintiff's
prima facie case. The plurality held that the plaintiff must prove that the
discriminatory factor was a "motivating factor" in the employer's decision,
while Justice O'Connor and Justice White applied a "substantial factor"
28
The opinions agreed that if a plaintiff
standard in their concurrences.
proved a prima facie case, the burden would shift to the employer to prove
that it would have made the same decision even without considering the
29
discriminatory reason.
An employer that satisfied its burden on this
30

affirmative defense would avoid liability under this framework.

After Price Waterhouse, most courts adopted the substantial factor
standard of the
causation

in

the

concurring
plaintiff's

opinions as
prima

the controlling standard of
31
facie case.
However, Congress

responded by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which clarified and
32
adjusted the mixed-motives proof structure.
Congress codified
"motivating factor" as the causation standard in the plaintiff's prima facie
33
case rather than "substantial factor." Congress also changed the analysis
of Price Waterhouse by providing that the same-decision defense is not a
complete defense, thereby avoiding liability. Instead, liability is still

28.

Id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id at 259 (White, J., concurring). It has been argued

that the use of different causation tenns by the plurality and O'Connor concurrence was not intended
to create different standards of causation. See Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence ol Title

VI/: Making Sense o.f Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 508 (2006). But see
R. Corbett, Babbling About Employment Discrimination: Does the Master Builder
Understand the Blueprint.for the Great Tower"!, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 683, 699 n.75 (2010). The case

William

from which the Court derived the analysis equated the two standards. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
29.

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246 & 258; id. at 279 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

30.

Id. at 258.

31.

See, e.g., Palmer v. Baker, 905 F.2d 1544, 1548 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (recognizing the

different causation standards in the plurality and concurrences and opting for "substantial factor"); see
also Maya R. Warrier, Note, Dare to Step Out of the Fogg: Single-Motive Versus Mixed-Motive
Analys is in Title VII Employment Discrimination Cases, 47 U. LOUISVILLE

L. REV.

409, 414 (2008)

(recognizing disagreement regarding the controlling standard, but stating that most courts opted for
"substantial factor").
32.

Pub.

L.

No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m),

2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012)).
33.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
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imposed even if the employer satisfies its burden on the same-decision
34
defense, but the defense limits the remedies that are available.
ln the wake of Price Waterhouse and even after the Civil Rights Act of
1991, courts grappled with determining which proof structure-pretext or

mixed motives-to apply in any given case. Most circuits seized upon the
dividing line cited by the O'Connor concurrence: cases in which there was
direct evidence of discrimination were analyzed under mixed motives, and
35
circumstantial evidence cases were analyzed under pretext. The courts of
appeals developed various definitions and standards to distinguish direct
from circumstantial evidence. An attempt to categorize the approaches of
the various circuits labeled them the "classic approach," the "animus plus
36
approach" and the "animus approach."
The tests were confusing and
uncertain-described by a court that sought to put an end to the distinction
37

as "chaos" and a "morass."

No matter how vexatious the dividing standard may have been, as long
as courts maintained a basis to distinguish between cases to be analyzed
under pretext and those to be analyzed under mixed motives, it was
reasonable, though challenging, for courts to continue using the two proof
structures, and a rich body of case law developed under them. However,
the Supreme Court seemingly upset this order when it held in Desert
Palace, Inc.

v.

Costa that direct evidence is not required for a plaintiff to
38
With that, the Court

be entitled to a motivating factor jury instruction.

erased the line separating the cases analyzed under pretext and those
analyzed under mixed motives. The Court based its holding on the fact
that the language added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not say
anything about the "motivating factor" standard being limited to direct
evidence cases .

39

Even Justice O'Connor, on whose Price Waterhouse

concurrence the distinction was based, agreed that the 1991 Act had
40
undermined the distinction.
The Court declined to say whether
elimination of the dividing line meant that all disparate treatment cases

34.

42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(2)(8). The limitation is significant, leaving the plaintiff with no

damages.
35.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 270-71 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

36. See, e.g., Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 852 53 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing the
categories developed by First Circuit Judge Selya), ajf'd, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
3 7.

Id. at 851 -53; see also Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination

Law Revisited: A Brief Updated View t?f the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651, 663 (2000) ("[T]he

various definitions raise the question whether the courts' attempts to draw bright-line tests between
direct and circumstantial evidence are really helpful at all.").
38. 539 U.S. 90, I 0 I (2003).
39. Id. at 99.
40.

Id. at 102 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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were to be analyzed under the mixed-motives framework.

41

169 1

The lower

courts were left with no guidance for deciding which framework to apply
.
.
many given case.
Desert Palace appeared to be a landmark development in the evolution
of the proof frameworks both for what it clearly did and for what it could
be read as implicitly doing. First, it expressly ended the division and
analysis of employment discrimination claims based on the type of
evidence (direct or circumstantial) on which they were based. This was a
good development in employment discrimination law because the dividing
line had proven to be chimerical. Second, Desert Palace could be read as
inferentially displacing the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis and
leaving all individual disparate treatment claims to be analyzed under the
statutory mixed-motives framework. Because Desert Palace did not
establish a new basis of demarcation between cases to be analyzed under
43
42
the two proof frameworks, some courts and commentators suggested or
argued

that

the

McDonnell

Douglas

arguments notwithstanding, the

framework

was

dead.

Those

courts continued to use the pretext

analysis, with most never mentioning that Desert Palace had erased the
dividing line and thereby called into question the continuing viability of
44
Moreover, many courts continued to refer to the
McDonnell Douglas.
pretext analysis as being for cases based on circumstantial evidence and
the mixed-motives analysis for cases based on direct evidence, saying that
when a plaintiff presents only circumstantial evidence the case must be
analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas analysis. The Fifth Circuit, for
example, recently declared this division by identifying the two categories
of evidence and the different analyses applicable to each in Etienne

v.

Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L. C., although the court in a
footnote mentioned some uncertainty about this dichotomy based on
45
Although it certainly was arguable that the pretext

Desert Palace.

41.

ln fact the Court said it would not say: "This case does not require us to decide when, if ever,

§ 107 applies outside of the mixed-motive context." Id. at 94 n. I (majority opinion).
42.

See, e.g., Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990--93 (D. Minn. 2003).

43.

See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of /:.,'/iminating Distinctions Among Title VII

Disparate

Treatment Cases,

57 SMU L. REV. 83,

I 02-03 (2004);

Melissa

Hart,

Subjel'live

Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 765-66 (2005); Jefrf ey A.
Van Delta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!": An Essay on the Quiet Demise c>f McDonnell Douglas
and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed
Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 76 (2003).

44.

See, e.g., Johnson v. Maestri Murrell Prop. Mgmt., 555 F. App'x 309, 311-12 (5 th Cir.

2014); Hamilton v. Oklahoma City Univ., 563 F. App'x 597, 600---0l (10th Cir. 2014); Vaughan v.
Morgan Stanley OW Inc., 158 F. App'x 205, 207 (I I th Cir. 2005).
45.

778 F.3d 473, 475 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Marable v. Marion Military Inst., 595 F.

App'x 921, 924 (11th Cir. 2014).
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analysis survived Desert Palace, the courts that insisted upon maintaining
the direct-circumstantial evidence dividing line were flouting the Court's
decision in Desert Palace. However, perhaps they were simply ahead of
their time, as the Court itself would rejuvenate the distinction in Youn g.
III.

YOUNG

V.

UPS:

FACTS AND COURT OPINIONS

Young was an air driver for UPS, where she had worked since

1 999.

Air drivers take packages and letters delivered by air, load them onto their
trucks, and deliver them. UPS had a requirement that all drivers must be
able to lift and handle packages weighing up to seventy pounds and to
assist with packages weighing up to

1 50

pounds. When Young became

pregnant, she was restricted from lifting over twenty pounds for the first
twenty weeks of her pregnancy and over ten pounds thereafter. UPS
informed her that she could not work at her driver job as long as she was
under the lifting restriction. Young unsuccessfully argued to be permitted
to continue in her driver job (because other employees had offered to assist
her with lifting)

or to do a light-duty job temporarily

during

her

pregnancy. UPS had made such accommodations for other employees in
three scenarios. First, UPS offered temporary transfers to light-duty jobs
for workers who suffered on-the-job injuries. Second, under the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement, UPS was required to give "inside
jobs" to drivers
Transportation.

who lost their
Finally,

UPS

certification by the

provided

reasonable

Department of

accommodations,

including some job reassignments, for disabled employees pursuant to the
Americans

with

Disabilities

Act.

After

Young's

request

for

accommodation was denied, she was placed on leave under the Family and
Medical Leave Act, and when that leave expired, she took extended leave
without pay and lost her group medical coverage.
Young filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging sex,
46
race, and pregnancy discrimination.
In her subsequent lawsuit, she
47
asserted claims for sex, race, and disability discrimination.
Young
48
moved to dismiss voluntarily her race discrimination claim,
and the trial
court granted summary judgment
disability

46.
(2015).

and

sex

in favor of the defendant on her
49
discrimination
claims.
Regarding
the
sex

Young v. United Parcel Serv .. Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 442

47.

Id.

48.

Id.

49.

Id.

(4th

Cir. 2013), rev'd, 135 S. Ct. 1338

YOUNG
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discrimination claims, the district court granted summary judgment,
reasoning that she did not produce direct evidence of discrimination and
that she could not establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell
Douglas framework because she did not identify a similarly situated

comparator who was treated more favorably.50
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the granting of summary judgment. First,
the court rejected the interpretation of the PDA's second clause as
requiring employers to treat pregnant workers the same as similarly
disabled nonpregnant workers by granting the same accommodations. The
Fourth Circuit characterized that interpretation of the PDA as creating an
impermissible "most favored nation"51 status for pregnant employees. 52
The court refused to adopt a broad reading of the second clause, which
would

create

a

cause of

action

separate and distinct from a sex

discrimination claim under section 703(a).53 Second, the Fourth Circuit
rejected the comments of a supervisor as direct evidence of employer
discriminatory motive.54 Finally, the court evaluated Young's claim under
the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework and held, as the district court
had, that Young could not establish a prima facie case because she
produced no evidence that similarly situated employees outside the
protected class received more favorable treatrnent.55 The court did not find
the other types of employees given temporary job reassignments to be
appropriate comparators.
The Supreme Court majority opinion considered two interpretations of
the second clause of the PDA. It rejected UPS's reading that the second
clause does no more than define sex discrimination to include pregnancy
discrimination because the first clause does that, and such an interpretation
would render the second clause superfluous.56 The majority also rejected
the broader reading espoused by Young because the majority agreed with
the Fourth Circuit that Congress did not intend, in enacting the PDA, to

50.

Id.

51.

Id. at 446. The tenn is borrowed from thelexicon of international trade, in which it describes

"{a] method of estab lishing equality of trading opportunity among states by guaranteeing that if one
country is given better trade terrns by another, then all other states must get the same terms."

Mos/
available at
http://legal-dictionary.th efreedictionary.com/Most-Favored-Nation+Status; see also Principles of the
Trading System, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://w w w .wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/fact2 e.htm
Favored-Nation Status,

WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 2008),

(lastvisited Junel l ,2015).
52.
53.
54.

-

Young, 707 F.3d at 446.

Id. at 447.
Id. at 449.

55.

Id. at 450.

56.

Young v . United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1 3 5 S . Ct. 1 338, 1 3 52-53 (20 1 5).

-

-

-·
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create a ..most-favored nation" status for pregnancy.57 Instead, the majority
interpreted the second clause as permitting a plaintiff to prove a pregnancy
discrimination claim with indirect evidence using the McDonnell Douglas
analysis.58 The majority described the analysis as proceeding in the
following way. First, the plaintiff would establish a prima facie case by
that

proving

she

belongs

to

a

protected

class,

sought

she

an

accommodation, and the employer denied the accommodation, although it
did accommodate others similarly able or unable to work. Next, the
employer would give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying
the

accommodation,

but

that

reason

normally

could

not

be

that

accommodating pregnant women was more expensive or less convenient.
Finally, the plaintiff would prove the employer's reason was pretextual,
and a jury question could be created on this issue, by producing sufficient
evidence that the employer's policy actually imposes a significant burden
on pregnant women-a burden which cannot be justified by the given
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and which permits an inference of
discrimination. Furthermore, the plaintiff can establish a genuine issue of
material fact regarding imposition of a significant burden at stage three by
presenting evidence that the employer accommodates a large percentage of
nonpregnant employees and fails to accommodate a large percentage of
pregnant employees. 59
Justice

Alito,

concurring

in

the

judgment,

did

not

rely

on

the

McDonnell Douglas analysis to interpret the second clause, but instead
offered an interpretation of the meaning of the second clause of the PDA
that was also different from either of the two advanced by the parties.
According to Justice Alito, an employer violates the second clause if it
docs not have a neutral business reason for treating pregnant employees
differently than nonpregnant employees who are reassigned.60
The dissent authored by Justice Scalia argued that the majority and the

concurrence erred by not accepting UPS' s reading of the second clause of

the PDA as adding nothing but clarity to the first clause, which simply

defines pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex discrimination.61 The
dissent saw the second clause as capable of only the two interpretations
advanced by the parties.62 Because the majority's application of the

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1349.
al 1353 54.
at 1354 55.
at 1359 (Alito, J.. concurring).
at 1363 (Scalia. J., dissenting).
at 1364.
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McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis requires a court to evaluate the effect

of the

employer's legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason, the dissent

characterized the approach as "allowing claims that belong under Title
VII's disparate-impact provisions to be brought under its disparate
treatment provisions instead."63 Justice Scalia's dissent also took the Alito

concurrence to task for its "text-free broadening" of the second clause.64

Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion expressed agreement with Justice

Scalia's dissent, which he joined, but also denounced indifference to the
plight of pregnant women in the workforce.65 Kennedy's dissent attempted
to minimize the effect of interpreting the second clause of the PDA as
Justice Scalia did by pointing out that there are other laws that may protect
and assist working pregnant women, including the Family and Medical
66
Leave Act and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. The Kennedy dissent
agreed with the Scalia dissent that the majority's interpretation of the PDA

risks conflating disparate treatment and disparate impact. Justice Kennedy

added that the majority's analysis "injects unnecessary confusion into the
67
accepted burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas."
IV. CONFUSION ABOUT STATUTES, THEORIES AND PROOF STRUCTURES:
WHEN

IN DOUBT,

LEA VE IT TO MCDONNELL DOUGLAS!

Young v. UPS is, in part, a microcosm of the development of federal

employment discrimination law and how it has gone awry. Fifty years ago,
faced with statutes that provide bare-bones prohibitions of discrimination

based on specified characteristics, the Supreme Court and lower courts
embarked

on a

large-scale

case

law

development

that

focused on

articulating theories of discrimination and, within those theories, proof
structures

or

frameworks. 68 Recognizing the opinion's place in that

lineage, early in the opinion, the Young majority set out a short primer on

three theories of discrimination: disparate treatment, disparate impact, and
pattern or practice (more properly, systemic disparate treatment).69 The
Court noted that Young alleged neither disparate impact nor pattern or

63.

Id. at 1366.

64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 1366-67 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

66.
67.
68.

Id. at 1367-68.
Id. at 1368.
Many of the Supreme Court's employment discrimination decisions have been about the

proof frameworks used to prove and analyze disparate treatment and disparate impact. See supra Part

II.
69.

Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1345.
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practice.

70

The Court further explained that under the disparate treatment

theory of discrimination, a plaintiff may prove discrimination either by
71
which,
direct evidence or by using the McDonnell Douglas analysis,
while

technically correct, is misleading and unnecessary in light of the

Court's decision in

Desert Palace in 2003.
The Young majority flew in McDonnell Douglas to provide the rescue

as a compromise rationale to fashion a majority opinion. Despite the
majority's unusual assurances that this modified

McDonnell Douglas

analysis would be limited in both scope and time of application,
the invocation of

72

I think

McDonnell Douglas is by no means as innocuous as the

majority suggests. Rather, the use of the pretext analysis reintroduces
some vexing issues into employment discrimination law that should have
been laid to rest in 2003, and it portends the continuing deployment of
pretext analysis to resolve issues that do not belong in that framework,
thereby stunting a more transparent and comprehensible development of
employment discrimination law. First, it resurrects the problematic and
once-rejected

division

between

direct

evidence

and

circumstantial

evidence cases, even if under the new labels of direct evidence and
indirect evidence (which likely is a distinction without a meaningful
difference). Second, it once again elevates the role of the

McDonnell

Douglas analysis in disparate treatment law, suggesting that almost any
issue of discrimination, including particularly challenging ones, can be
stuffed into the three-part framework. Thus, lower courts will take their
cue to analyze most intentional discrimination cases under

McDonnell
Douglas, no matter how poor the fit between the case and the pretext
framework. Neither of these probable results will be good for employment

discrimination law.
A.

Did the Young Majority Forget or Ignore Desert Palace?
In

Young, the Court majority seemingly followed the lead of lower
Desert Palace, declaring that

courts and forgot or ignored the holding of

"a plaintiff can prove disparate treatment either ( l ) by direct evidence that
a workplace policy, practice, or decision relies expressly on a protected
characteristic, or (2) by using the burden-shifting framework set forth in

McDonnell Douglas."73 Later the Court states that "an individual pregnant
70.
71.

72.
73.

Id.
Id.

See text accompanying supra notes t 3 14.
Young. 135 S. Ct. at 1345.
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worker who seeks to show disparate treatment through indirect evidence
74
McDonnell Douglas framework."

may do so through application of the
How could the

Young case be resolved this way twelve years after the
Palace, Inc. v. Costa?75 The Court should have been
aware it was contravening Desert Palace, as this was pointed out in an

Court decided Desert

amicus brief filed by law professors and women's and civil rights
76
orgamzations.
.

In

•

Desert Palace, the Court erased the dividing line between

intentional discrimination cases relying on direct evidence and those based
on circumstantial evidence by declaring that direct evidence is not required
77
to bring a case under the mixed-motives framework.
Since Desert

Palace, many courts steadfastly and repeatedly have indicated that they do
not

understand

that

decision

to

have

erased

direct
78
evidence/circumstantial evidence dividing line in discrimination law.
Some courts seemingly have tried to give effect to

the

Desert Palace while

fashioning an only slightly different dichotomy from that rejected in

Desert Palace. Such courts say that when no direct evidence exists,
plaintiffs may prove their cases by using the McDonnell Douglas indirect
method, but the direct method requires plaintiffs to show the employer's
illegal motive through either direct or circumstantial evidence. 79 Thus,
those courts shifted from speaking of direct and circumstantial evidence to
direct and indirect methods, while also incorporating the two kinds of
evidence. Another analytic variation devised by some courts explains that
the courts are not contravening

Desert Palace because "direct" evidence is

not the converse of circumstantial evidence.

80

Suffice it to say that lower

79.

Id. at 1 3 5 3 .
5 3 9 U.S. 90 (2003).
Brief of Law Professors and Women's and Civil Rights Organ izations as Amici Curiae in
of Petitioner, Young (No. 1 2- 1 226), 201 4 WL 4536935.
See supra Part II.
See supra notes 44-45.
See, e.g. , Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 845 (7th Cir. 201 2); Marich v. Sch. Town of

80.

See Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004). The Eighth Circuit

74.
75.
76.
Support
77.
78.

Munster, Ind., No. 2: I J -cv-96, 201 5 WL I 865549, at *5-6 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 23, 201 5).
explained this approach as follows:

Thus, "direct" refers to the causal strength of the proof, not whether it is "circumstantial"
evidence. A plaintiff with strong (direct) evidence that i llegal discrimination motivated the

employer's adverse action does not need the three-part McDonnell Douglas analysis to get to

the jury, regardless of whether his strong evidence is circumstantial. But i f the plaintiff lacks
evidence that clearly points to the presence of an i llegal motive, he must avoid summary
judgment by creating the requisite in ference of unlawful discrimination through the

Id

McDonneil Douglas analysis, including sufficient evidence of pretext.
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courts, left with n o basis to distinguish which disparate treatment cases get
which analysis after Desert Palace, have tried different approaches that all
approximate the pre-Desert Palace l aw . In doing so, the lower courts have
facially, but not substantively, honored the holding of Desert Palace that
the

distinction between types

of evidence

does

not

determine the

applicable analytical framework and is of little moment because direct
81

evidence is not necessarily superior to circumstantial.

In Young, the current Court showed how little it respects the Desert
Palace decision. The use of different terms raises the possibility that the

Court in Young is not reviving the pre-Desert Palace dichotomy, but
instead is trying to follow lower c ourts in establishing a new guide for
determining how to analyze

disparate

treatment cases,

based on a

distinction between "direct" evidence and "indirect" evidence, that is
somehow different from the old divide between direct and circumstantial
82
evidence. This solution seems unlikely, and if that is what the Court was
doing in Young, it did not make that clear. Moreover, adoption of such a
new dichotomy would be troubling, because it would reintroduce nebulous
standards used to make distinctions between amorphous categories of
evidence that existed before Desert Palace. The putative new dichotomy
would be as unfaithful to Desert Palace as would be reintroducing the
83
circumstantial/direct
dichotomy
that
Desert
Palace
abrogated.
Regardless of what the Court intended with its direct/indirect evidence
distinction in Young, it likely resuscitated the importance o f distinguishing
between the different categories of evidence used to prove disparate
treatment.
B. Back to the Future: Young Reanimates McDonnell Douglas

Over its forty-plus years, the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework
has come under increasing criticism. The stage one prima facie case and
the stage three pretext parts of the analysis have been exposed as artificial
84

and not particularly probative of the ultimate question of discrimination.

The prima facie case has been discredited for its shifting and uncertain
elements and its attenuated relationship to whether discrimination actually

8 1 . In Desert Palace, the Court explained that circumstantial evidence is not necessarily inferior
to direct evidence and, in some cases, circumstantial evidence is more persuasive than direct evidence.
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003).
82.

See id.

83.

See supra text accompanying notes

84.

See. e.g., William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext jor Res /psa loquitur: A Proposal to let

38--40.

Employment Discrimination Speakfor Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV.

447, 494-99 (20 1 3).
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occurred. 8 5 The pretext stage has raised questions regarding its substantive
and procedural meaning, requiring clarification from the Supreme Court in
86
St. Mary 's Honor Center v. Hicks
and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
8
Products, Inc. 7 As it has developed, the third stage proof of pretext has
been less helpful in answering the ultimate question of discrimination than
88
the analysis originally seemed to promise. Overall, the weakness of the
framework is that it asks questions that may lead to a finding of
discrimination, but the correlation between the analysis and the ultimate
8
issue of intentional discrimination in any given case is tenuous. 9 Beyond
the problems with the analysis itself, the courts' application of it has
created additional problems. Rather than using the McDonnell Douglas
analysis as a method of proof that is appropriate for some cases, the courts
have come to treat it as a straightj acket into which the vast maj ority of
disparate treatment claims must be forced, regardless of the fit. 90 At its
inception and in its early life, the C ourt did not intend for the McDonnell
Douglas framework to be so used.91

After Desert Palace, the Court left us with no way to allocate claims
between pretext and mixed motives, and thus another reason to dispatch
with the pretext analysis was added to the mounting criticisms of the aging
framework. Young has negated the argument that Desert Palace implicitly
eliminated the McDonnell Douglas analysis by erasing the type-of
cvidcnce dividing line. Moreover, in Young, the Court sent the message
that hard questions of employment discrimination law can be resolved by

85. See. e.g., Smith, supra note 5, at 372-78 (describing the elements of the prima facie case as
"moving targets" and criticizing the prima facie case as "only marginally related to the focus of the
case");

see

also Malamud, supra note 5, at 2282-2301 (discussing these and other problems with the

prima facie case). The Supreme Court explained the rationale for inferring discrimination based on a
prima facie case: If the two most common legitimate reasons for rejection of an applicant, lack o f
quali fications and lack o f a vacancy, can b e ruled out, a n inference o f discrimination is reasonable i n
the absence o f other explanation. lnt'I Bhd. o f Teamsters v. United States, 431 U . S . 324, 358 n.44

( 1 977).
86. 509 U.S. 502, 509- 1 1 ( 1 993).
87. 5 30 U.S. 1 33, 146-49 (2000).
88. See Corbett, supra note 84, at 498-99.
89. See, e.g. , Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination law, 1 1 0 MICH. L. REV. 69, 94
(201 1 ) (explaining that "[e]mbedded within the McDonnell Douglas inquiry are several sets of facts
that masquerade as legal standards"); John Valery White, The Irrational Tum in Employment

Discrimination law: Slouching Toward a Unified Approach to Civil Rights law, 53 MERCER L. REV.

709, 7 1 1 (2002) ("[M]osl commentators agreed that the artificial nature of the McDonnell Douglas

proof structure, especially its very light prima facie case, was the root of the problem.").

90.
91.

See Corbett, supra note 84, at 50 1 --05.
Fumco Constr. Corp. v . Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1 978) ("The method suggested in

McDonnell Douglas for pursuing this inquiry, however, was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or
ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sen sible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence i n light of common
experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.").
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forcing them into the three stages of McDonnell Douglas. After Young,
McDonnell Douglas is very much alive and well and commissioned to

dominate disparate treatment analysis.
The area of employment discrimination and the law regulating it
present many hard questions. It seems that the Court and courts would
better develop the law by addressing those hard questions rather than
forcing them into a proof framework, composed o f surrogate questions,
which have little to do with the issue. To illustrate, on remand, the plaintiff
in Young may win the case or lose it. The result will be based on whether
the fact finder chooses to infer or not to infer discriminatory intent of the
employer. Such results still will not tell employers, employees, lawyers,
and courts whether employers that provide accommodations to other
disabled employees must provide them to pregnant employees. Plaintiffs
making such claims presumably will win some and lose some. The law is
left unclear, and a j ury's finding of pretext or no pretext has little to do
with the question presented. Making the issue of duty of accommodation a
question of pretext is just that-a pretext.
Young will empower courts to c ontinue labeling cases as based on

direct or indirect evidence, and then to force those labeled indirect into the
pretext framework regardless of how poorly they fit into it. 92 Young itself
is not well described as a circumstantial or indirect evidence case. The
employer provided temporary j ob

reassignments to some employees

temporari ly unable to perform their jobs but not to pregnant employees
93
Once the
rendered temporarily unable to perform because of pregnancy.
claim is forced into the pretext framework, it should be clear how inapt is
the analysis.94 In reality, there is no issue of pretext. The Court says that at
this stage, the plaintiff may prevail by "providing sufficient evidence that
the employer's policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers,
and that the employer's ' legitimate, nondiscriminatory' reasons are not
sufficiently strong to justify the burden," which will permit the fact finder
to infer intentional diserimination.95 Justice Scalia' s dissenting opinion
characterizes the maj ority's articulation of what would happen at stage
three of the McDonnell Douglas analysis as an "ersatz disparate-impact

92. The McDonnell Douglas pretext fram ework is more troubling in this regard than the mixed
McDonnell Douglas series of surrogate questions is more restrictive than

motives analysis because the

the more open-ended inquiry in the statutory mixed-motives framework-w hether discrimination was
a motivating factor in the employer's decision.
9 3 . Young. 135 S. Ct. at 1344.

94. See McGin ley, supra note 8 (discussing three reasons why McDonnell Douglas was not
needed to analyze discrimination in the case).

95.

Young v. United Parcel Serv ., Inc.,

135 S. Ct . 1338, 1354 (2015).
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test."96 Perhaps. Whatever it is, it is not a showing o f pretext because
pretext has nothing to do with the facts of the case.
The

Young case

is reminiscent of many other cases

presenting

challenging but clear questions regarding discrimination in which courts
dutifully forced them into a proof framework, usually and overwhelmingly
the McDonnell Douglas framework, and thus obscured the real issue.
Consider for example, Burlington

v.

News Corp. , a case in which a

Caucasian news anchor was fired after his use of the word "n

_

_

_

_

r" in a

meeting to discuss whether the word should be used in a news report
caused substantial racial unrest in the workplace.97 The Caucasian plaintiff
contended that he was disciplined for a nonderogatory use of the word,

�

while man
disciplined.

8

black

employees

who

also

used

the

word were

not

The court recognized the threshold question of which

analysis it should apply-the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis or
.
.
1 00
99
.
.
. was usmg b oth anaI yses,
b ut it posed
The court sai. d it
m1xe
d -motives.
the key question ostensibly under the pretext stage: "can an employer be
held liable under Title VII for enforcing or condoning the social norm that
it is acceptable for African Americans to say

'

[n

_

_

r] ' but not

whites?"1 0 1 Thus, the court identified the core discrimination issue in the
_

_

case, one that merited careful consideration, but an issue that actually had
little to do with the McDonnell Douglas analysis, although the court
dutifully crammed it into the pretext stage Examining that issue, the court
.
concluded that African Americans indeed might tolerate use of the word
by other African Americans and be insulted when the word is used by
10
white people. 2 Nevertheless, the court found that even if such a social
norm exists, it was the type of discriminatory social norm that Title VII
03
was enacted to counter. 1
Burlington confronted an important
discrimination issue and is an equally important holding, but the case had

nothing to do with pretext.
Burlington, like Young, is a case of comparative treatment. As in
Young, it presents a challenging but clear question to be resolved under

discrimination law, and it is a question that becomes less stark and
comprehensible when buried in the McDonnell Douglas analysis under the

96.

Id. at 1 366 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

97.

759 F. Supp. 2d 580, 585 (E.D. Pa. 20 1 0).

98.

Id. at 593-94.

99.

I 00.

I0 I .
I 02.
1 03.

Id. at 590-9 1 .

Id. at 59 1 .

Id. at 596.

Id at 597.
Id

1 702
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guise of pretext. The Court in Young suggested that it was doing little
harm because its analysis may have a short life, as future cases of the type
may be decided under the ADA Amendments Act of 2 00 8 . However, the
Court's approach of burying hard questions within McDonnell Douglas
will empower courts to be weak.
V. CONCLUSION

The Young maj ority forgot the lessons of the past, and in so doing, it
returned to the past. Price

Waterhouse

v.

taught that the

Hopkins

McDonnell Douglas framework is not appropriate to address all types of

cases, and so the Court created the mixed-motives analysis. Desert Palace
v.

Costa

taught

that

the

distinction

between

direct

evidence

and

circumstantial evidence cases is not supported by the statutory l anguage,
but the Court did not explain what follows from eradicating that dividing
line. Desert Palace should have announced the demise of McDonnell
Douglas.

Now in

Young, the

C ourt returns to the

type-of-evidence

dividing line and reinvigorates a proof framework that should have died.
Unwilling to treat the case as presenting a question of statutory
interpretation that could go either o f two ways, the Court chose to force it
into a proof structure. That was an unfortunate decision that obscured the
issue. From there, the Court could have placed it under the mixed-motives
analysis with its prima facie case standard of "motivating factor" and the
remedy-limiting same-decision defense. That proof structure is established
by statute, and it permits a more open-ended inquiry without forcing
evidence into a series of surrogate questions in three stages. The Young
Court could have done that because Desert Palace hel d that the mixed
motives framework is not l imited to cases involving direct evidence.
Although not the best approach to resolving the case, the mixed-motives
analysis would have permitted flexibility to discuss the relevant issues.
Instead, McDonnell Douglas flew in to rescue the Court from having to
answer a hard question of statutory interpretation.
The Young majority opinion may p lease nostalgia buffs and McDonnell
Douglas fans, but it is bad law. Although the Court suggests the decision

will have limited effect, I think the C ourt is wrong.

Young divides

intentional discrimination claims based on labeling o f evidence and
fortifies

McDonnell Douglas,

employment discrimination law.

and

neither development

is good for

